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Abstract: Act consequentialism states that an act is right iff 
the expected value of its outcome is at least as great as the 
expected value of any other act’s outcome. Two objections to 
this view are as follows. The first is that act consequentialism 
cannot account for our normative ambivalence in cases where 
agents perform the right act out of bad motives. The second is 
that act consequentialism is silent on questions of character: 
questions like ‘What are the right motives to have?’ and ‘What 
kind of person ought I be?’. These objections have been taken to 
motivate a move to global consequentialism, on which acts are 
not the only subjects of normative assessment. Motives and 
decision-procedures (amongst other things) are also judged right 
or wrong by direct reference to their consequences. In this paper, 
I argue that these objections fail to motivate the move from act 
to global consequentialism. 
1. Introduction 
Consequentialist theories begin with an axiology: a betterness ordering over 
outcomes. To this axiology, act consequentialists add the claim that acts are 
subject to normative assessment. An act is right iff the expected value of its 
outcome is at least as great as the expected value of any other act’s outcome. An 
act is wrong otherwise. And, on act consequentialism, acts are the only subjects 
of normative assessment. Terms like ‘right’, ‘wrong’, ‘obligatory’, and 
‘permissible’ apply to acts and acts alone. 
Global consequentialists go further. On the purest form of the view, 
everything is normatively assessed by direct reference to the expected value of its 
outcome (Pettit and Smith 2000). Climates, eye colours, and constellations are 
either right or wrong, just as acts are. A more moderate global consequentialism 
demurs from these judgements, but nevertheless takes motives and decision-
procedures (amongst other things) to be subjects of normative assessment 
(Feldman 1993; Louise 2006; Driver 2014; Greaves 2020). A set of motives, for 
example, is right for a person to have iff the expected value of having those 
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motives is at least as great as the expected value of having any other set of 
motives. Having a set of motives is wrong otherwise. 
Why extend normative assessment beyond acts? The main reason offered in 
the literature is that the resulting theory has more expressive power (Ord 2008, 
31, 50–51). In particular, it’s been argued that global consequentialism, but not 
act consequentialism, can account for our normative ambivalence in cases where 
agents perform the right act out of bad motives (Louise 2006, 66, 84; Driver 2014, 
168; Greaves 2020, 438). And it’s been argued that act consequentialism, but not 
global consequentialism, is silent on questions of character: questions like ‘What 
are the right motives to have?’ and ‘What kind of person ought I be?’ (Feldman 
1993, 212; Louise 2006, 68; Driver 2014, 167–70; Greaves 2020, 436). 
In this paper, I argue that these advantages are illusory. If certain empirical 
hypotheses about the persistence and causal efficacy of motives and decision-
procedures are true, then both species of consequentialism can account for our 
normative ambivalence and offer responses to questions of character. If these 
hypotheses are false, then neither species can. So, whether the hypotheses are 
true or not, the Normative Ambivalence and Character objections give us no 
reason to prefer global consequentialism. 
2. Normative Ambivalence and Character 
Consider a case slightly adapted from Thomson (1976, 206): 
Sarah – a doctor – kills a healthy person. She uses that person’s 
organs to save the lives of five patients. 
Granted we fill out the details of this case in a certain way (Sarah knows that no 
one will find out, that the healthy person has no family or friends, etc.), act 
consequentialists will say that Sarah’s act is right. And since on their view 
normative assessment applies only to acts, they seem committed to the claim 
that nothing is wrong in this situation. But, as many point out, there’s something 
deeply amiss about the agents in these kinds of cases (Driver 2014; Greaves 2020). 
Normative ambivalence strikes us as a more appropriate response than whole-
hearted approval. 
Global consequentialists can account for our normative ambivalence. They 
too will judge that Sarah’s act is right. But her performing that act suggests that 
her motives are ruthless, and global consequentialists can say that these are the 
wrong motives. After all, motives are persistent, and ruthless motives are much 
less felicitous than compassionate ones in most situations. That makes plausible 
the claim that having compassionate motives has greater expected value, even 
taking into account the chance that compassion would have prevented Sarah from 
killing the unwilling organ donor. Global consequentialists might say something 
similar about Sarah’s decision-procedure. Her act suggests that her decision-
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procedure is calculating; a spontaneous decision-procedure has greater expected 
value; and hence Sarah’s act suggests that she has the wrong decision-procedure. 
These global consequentialist judgements – that Sarah’s act is right, but her 
motives and decision-procedure are wrong – accord better with our intuitive 
appraisal of the case than the act consequentialist verdict. 
Act consequentialism is also alleged to be incomplete. More specifically, it’s 
said to be silent on questions of character: questions about the normative status 
of motives and decision-procedures. Since act consequentialism restricts 
normative assessment to acts, it cannot offer satisfactory responses to character 
questions like ‘What are the right motives to have?’ and ‘What decision-
procedure ought I have?’. Global consequentialism, on the other hand, takes these 
character questions in its stride. Agents ought to have those motives and that 
decision-procedure with the greatest expected value. 
So much for the criticisms of act consequentialism. Now for two possible 
responses. The first is the evaluative strategy. Remember that all consequentialist 
theories begin with an axiology: a betterness ordering over outcomes. That allows 
act consequentialists to respond to each objection in evaluative terms. They can 
account for our normative ambivalence by claiming that, although Sarah’s act is 
right, her motives and decision-procedure are bad. It would be better overall if 
she had compassionate motives and a spontaneous decision-procedure. Act 
consequentialists can also offer evaluative responses to the character questions. 
To the question, ‘What are the right motives to have?’, they can reply, ‘Having 
compassionate motives has greatest expected value.’ 
This response may satisfy some. However, the character questions are 
normative so global consequentialists might well claim that only a normative 
answer will do. What’s more, as the popularity of deontological theories attests, 
it’s not obviously incoherent to suppose that what’s best differs from what’s right. 
Having identified the motives with the greatest expected value, there remains a 
further question whether these are the right motives.1 Global consequentialists 
might say something similar with respect to normative ambivalence. Our worry 
about Sarah killing the donor is not just that something is bad; it’s that something 
is wrong. 
That brings us to the second possible response. Act consequentialists can 
try to domesticate global consequentialism (Railton 1984, 159–60; 1988, 403; 
Gruzalski 1986, 776). More precisely, they can replace the state-verbs in global 
consequentialist judgements with action-verbs, and hence bring correlates of these 
expressions into the act consequentialist fold. Whenever global consequentialists 
say, ‘Sarah ought to have compassionate motives,’ act consequentialists can say, 
 
1 As Chappell (2012) and McElwee (2020) point out, one can be a consequentialist about acts 
and yet claim that the normative status of non-acts depends on factors besides their expected 
value, like their intrinsic fittingness. 
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‘Sarah ought to develop compassionate motives.’ This manoeuvre yields a kind of 
normative ambivalence. By continuing to have ruthless motives, Sarah is failing 
to do what she ought. The domestication strategy also allows act 
consequentialists to give normative responses to the character questions. To the 
question, ‘What kind of person ought I be?’, they can reply, ‘You ought to become 
X kind of person.’ 
But, as Ord points out, there’s an issue here (2009, 23). Developing new 
motives and adopting new decision-procedures takes time. And this time-lag 
between acts and their fruits renders the act consequentialist domestication of 
global consequentialist judgements imperfect. We can illustrate the issue as 
follows. Granted we fill out the case in a certain way, global consequentialists will 
say that Sarah ought to have compassionate motives even as she’s preparing to 
kill the unwilling donor. Such motives might prevent Sarah from killing, but they 
have greatest expected value overall because a compassionate Sarah would 
perform better acts in later situations. Per the domestication strategy above, act 
consequentialists should swap the state-verb for an action-verb. But Sarah 
certainly ought not choose this time to develop compassionate motives. That’s 
because developing compassionate motives plausibly requires (a) compassionate 
acts and (b) time. So, if Sarah chose this time to develop compassionate motives, 
she would fail to perform the right act of killing the donor and fail to perform 
the right act in many later situations, in virtue of her (still) ruthless motives. 
The act consequentialist account of normative ambivalence thus evaporates. In 
killing the donor, Sarah does nothing wrong. Global consequentialism turns out 
to be harder to domesticate than we thought. 
Nevertheless, I argue, the domestication strategy is a winning one for act 
consequentialists. Although time-lag scuppers the naïve version outlined above, 
the persistence and causal efficacy of motives and decision-procedures allows for 
a more sophisticated kind of domestication. In brief, act consequentialists can 
account for our normative ambivalence by noting that Sarah’s act is evidence 
that she has acted and will act wrongly at other times. And they can respond to 
the character questions by pointing out that some motives and decision-
procedures are more conducive to right acts than others.  
I develop these ideas below, using motives to illustrate. Decision-procedures 
can be treated in a similar manner.2 
3. Empirical Hypotheses 
Here are three empirical hypotheses: 
 
2 Plausibly, it’s easier to adopt new decision-procedures than new motives. If so, time-lag is less 
of a problem for decision-procedures. Any cases where time-lag remains an issue can be handled 
in the way I outline below. I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this point. 
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Motives depend on acts 
We develop compassionate (ruthless) motives by performing 
compassionate (ruthless) acts in ordinary situations. 
Motives affect acts 
The more compassionate (ruthless) a person’s motives, the more 
likely they are to perform a compassionate (ruthless) act. 
Extraordinary acts, extraordinary motives 
A person will kill the unwilling organ donor iff they have 
extraordinarily ruthless motives. 
And here are some assumptions to simplify the discussion. Each act is either 
compassionate or ruthless. Compassionate motives and ruthless motives are 
mutually exclusive, and each person starts out poised between the two. In 
ordinary situations, the right act by consequentialist lights is compassionate. In 
extraordinary situations like Sarah’s, the right act is ruthless. Most situations are 
ordinary. 
If the above three hypotheses are true, Sarah’s act of killing allows us to 
draw inferences about her past and future acts. ‘Extraordinary acts, 
extraordinary motives’ lets us infer that Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless 
motives. ‘Motives depend on acts’ then lets us infer that Sarah has performed 
ruthless acts in ordinary situations, and so has acted wrongly in the past. ‘Motives 
affect acts’ lets us infer that Sarah will likely continue to perform ruthless acts in 
ordinary situations, and so will likely continue to act wrongly in the future. Act 
consequentialists can thus account for our normative ambivalence. Sarah is right 
to kill the donor, but whole-hearted approval seems inappropriate because her 
act is evidence that her past and future acts are wrong. 
The truth of the above hypotheses would also allow act consequentialists to 
offer new responses to character questions like ‘What motives ought I have?’. 
Given ‘Motives depend on acts,’ act consequentialists can say, 
(1) If you act as you ought in ordinary situations, you will have 
compassionate motives. 
Given ‘Motives affect acts,’ act consequentialists can add,  
(2) If you have compassionate motives, you’re more likely to act 
as you ought. 
And, in cases where time-lag is not an issue, they can say,  
(3) You ought to develop compassionate motives. 
Global consequentialists might object that these responses are still too 
roundabout. Not one is as simple and direct as the global consequentialist answer: 
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‘You ought to have compassionate motives.’ But this answer’s simplicity and 
directness strike me as dubious virtues. Were you to ask, ‘Why ought I have 
compassionate motives?’, a large part of the global consequentialist response 
would involve repeating the act consequentialist’s response (2) above.3 What’s 
more, if the global consequentialist answer is to be of practical interest, it must 
offer guidance (Gruzalski 1986, 775–76). And, as far as guidance goes, the act 
consequentialist’s response (3) matches the global consequentialist’s: one can 
abide by the instruction to have compassionate motives only by developing 
compassionate motives. For these reasons, I claim that the act consequentialist’s 
responses to the character questions are (at least) as good as the global 
consequentialist’s response. 
Of course, the empirical hypotheses I give above are too strong. ‘Motives 
depend on acts’ and ‘Extraordinary acts’ are framed as certainties, but 
hypotheses about the connection between acts and motives can be at best 
probabilistic. With that in mind, we can weaken ‘Motives depend on acts’ as 
follows: 
Motives depend on acts (probabilistic) 
Performing compassionate (ruthless) acts in ordinary situations 
makes a person more likely to develop compassionate (ruthless) 
motives. 
‘Motives affect acts’ is already probabilistic. I repeat it here for ease of reference: 
Motives affect acts (probabilistic) 
The more compassionate (ruthless) a person’s motives, the more 
likely they are to perform a compassionate (ruthless) act. 
We can weaken ‘Extraordinary acts’ as follows: 
Extraordinary acts, extraordinary motives 
(probabilistic) 
A person with extraordinarily ruthless motives is more likely to 
kill the unwilling donor. 
Now what can we infer from Sarah’s act of killing? The probabilistic version of 
‘Extraordinary acts’, plus Bayes’ theorem, implies that we should increase our 
credence that Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless motives.4 Given the probabilistic 
 
3 Only ‘a large part’ because some of the consequences of motives and decision-procedures are 
not mediated by acts. I address this point below. 
4 Let  = Sarah killed the donor. Let  = Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless motives. 
‘Extraordinary acts’ states that () < (|). Bayes’ theorem states that (|) =
(|).  () ()⁄ . Substituting (|) gives () < (|).  () ()⁄ . Rearranging and 
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version of ‘Motives depend on acts,’ that in turn implies that we should increase 
our credence that Sarah has acted wrongly at least  times in the past, for any 
positive integer .5 Given the probabilistic version of ‘Motives affect acts,’ we 
should increase our credence that Sarah will act wrongly at least  times in the 
future, for any positive integer .6 The upshot is that even these probabilistic 
hypotheses yield an act consequentialist account of our normative ambivalence. 
Sarah’s act of killing is right, but it’s evidence that her past and future acts are 
wrong. 
The probabilistic hypotheses also permit act consequentialist responses to 
the character questions. To the question, ‘What motives ought I have?’, act 
consequentialists can respond,  
(1*) If you act as you ought in ordinary situations, you will likely 
have compassionate motives. 
(2*) If you have compassionate motives, you’re more likely to 
act as you ought. 
And in cases where time-lag is not an issue,  
(3*) You ought to develop compassionate motives. 
Now suppose that even the probabilistic version of ‘Motives depend on acts’ is 
not true of Sarah: performing compassionate (ruthless) acts makes Sarah no more 
likely to form compassionate (ruthless) motives. In that case, act 
consequentialists can still account for our normative ambivalence. The 
probabilistic versions of ‘Extraordinary acts’ and ‘Motives affect acts’ still imply 
that, after learning Sarah killed the donor, we should increase our credence that 
Sarah will perform at least  wrong acts in the future. And act consequentialists 
can still offer (2*) and (3*) as responses to the character questions. 
Suppose instead that even the probabilistic version of ‘Motives affect acts’ 
is not true of Sarah: Sarah’s probability of performing a compassionate versus 
ruthless act in an ordinary situation is the same no matter what her motives. In 
this case too, act consequentialists can account for our normative ambivalence. 
The probabilistic versions of ‘Extraordinary acts’ and ‘Motives depend on acts’ 
 
cancelling () gives () < (|). In other words, learning that Sarah killed the donor 
should increase our credence that she has extraordinarily ruthless motives. 
5 Let  = Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless motives. Let  = Sarah has performed at least  
wrong acts. ‘Motives depend on acts’ states that () < (|). By Bayes’ theorem, () <
(|). In other words, increasing our credence that Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless motives 
should increase our credence that Sarah has performed at least  wong acts. 
6  Let  = Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless motives. Let  = Sarah will perform at least  
wrong acts in the future. ‘Motives affect acts’ implies that () < (|). In other words, 
increasing our credence that Sarah has extraordinarily ruthless motives should increase our 
credence that Sarah will perform at least  wrong acts in the future. 
8 
 
still imply that we should increase our credence that Sarah has performed at least 
 wrong acts in the past. And act consequentialists can still offer (1*) and (3*) 
as responses to the character questions. 
Now suppose that neither ‘Motives depend on acts’ nor ‘Motives affect acts’ 
is true of Sarah: in ordinary situations, Sarah’s acts have no effect on her motives 
and her motives have no effect on her acts. In that case, we cannot infer anything 
about Sarah’s past or future acts in ordinary situations from her act of killing, so 
the act consequentialists’ account of our normative ambivalence evaporates. The 
same goes for their three responses to the character questions. 
But note two points. The first is that this implication might be just what 
we want. If Sarah’s motives are entirely inert in ordinary situations, then whole-
hearted approval of Sarah’s act does not seem inappropriate, and the character 
questions seem to lack any sensible answer. The second is that, in any case, global 
consequentialists are in a similar predicament. Set aside for a moment any 
consequences of motives not mediated by acts.7 If Sarah’s motives are inert in 
ordinary situations, then the expected value of her having compassionate motives 
is no greater than the expected value of her having ruthless motives. That means 
that the global consequentialists’ account of our normative ambivalence and their 
answers to the character questions also evaporate. 
Now suppose instead that the probabilistic version of ‘Extraordinary 
motives’ is not true of Sarah: having extraordinarily ruthless motives makes Sarah 
no more likely to kill the donor. In that case, we cannot infer anything about 
Sarah’s motives from her act of killing. That in turn implies that we cannot infer 
anything about her past and future acts, so the act consequentialist’s account of 
our normative ambivalence evaporates. But, again, so does the global 
consequentialist’s: having ruthless motives might be wrong, but Sarah’s act is no 
evidence that she has such motives. As before, act consequentialism matches 
global consequentialism for expressive power. 
I can now discuss a matter twice-delayed. Thus far, I have assumed that all 
the consequences of motives are mediated by acts, but that is not true (Pettit 
and Smith 2000, 122; Louise 2006, 67; Chappell 2012, 697–98). Even if having 
compassionate motives would not affect Sarah’s acts in ordinary situations, 
having them might have greater expected value than having ruthless motives in 
virtue of the joy that they inspire in Sarah. If this joy is great enough, global 
consequentialists will judge that Sarah ought to have compassionate motives. 
My response is that the dialectic is the same here as elsewhere. In cases 
where time-lag is not an issue, act consequentialists can substitute an action-verb 
in place of the global consequentialist’s state-verb: Sarah ought to develop 
 
7 Again, I address this point below. 
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compassionate motives. In continuing to have ruthless motives, Sarah is failing 
to do as she ought. 
Now consider a case where time-lag is an issue. Sarah has killed the donor 
as before, but this time our empirical hypotheses are different. Instead of ‘Motives 
depend on acts,’ we have: 
Changing motives takes time 
We can change our motives only gradually over time. 
Instead of ‘Motives affect acts,’ we have: 
Motives affect joy 
The more compassionate our motives, the more we enjoy each 
day. 
Granted that the joy arising from compassion is great enough, global 
consequentialists can say that Sarah ought to have compassionate motives. But 
act consequentialists cannot say that Sarah ought to develop compassionate 
motives. Given ‘Extraordinary acts,’ that would prevent her from killing the 
donor, and given ‘Changing motives takes time,’ she would still have ruthless 
motives for a period afterward. And this time act consequentialists cannot say 
that Sarah’s act is evidence that she has acted and will act ruthlessly in ordinary 
situations because, ex hypothesi, her acts are unaffected by her motives. So, we 
might think, global consequentialists can account for our normative ambivalence 
and answer the character questions in this case, while act consequentialists 
cannot. 
But note that, as before, Sarah’s act is evidence that she has extraordinarily 
ruthless motives. And given ‘Changing motives takes time,’ that in turn is 
evidence that Sarah has acted wrongly in the past by failing to develop 
compassionate motives. And insofar as a person’s past acts are a guide to their 
future acts, it is evidence that she will continue to act wrongly in this way. Once 
again, we have an act consequentialist account of our normative ambivalence. 
The same point allows act consequentialists to respond to the character questions. 
They can say, ‘If you act as you ought, you will develop compassionate motives.’ 
Now consider a final case.8 Sarah exists for just a moment. Her only act is 
right, but her motives are ruthless, and compassionate motives would give her 
greater joy. In this case, global consequentialism implies that we should be 
normatively ambivalent: Sarah’s act is right, but her motives are wrong. Act 
consequentialism, meanwhile, implies that we shouldn’t be normatively 
ambivalent: Sarah never acts wrongly. One might take this case as reason to prefer 
global consequentialism. 
 
8 I thank an anonymous referee for bringing this case to my attention. 
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I claim, however, that this case is better understood as a point in favour of 
act consequentialism. That’s because normative ambivalence seems 
inappropriate: Sarah’s motives are certainly unfortunate, but nothing about her 
seems wrong. What’s more, act consequentialism gives us the reason why: Sarah 
does nothing wrong. She doesn’t choose her ruthless motives, and she’s so short-
lived that she can do nothing to change them. 
4. Conclusion 
Global consequentialists argue that their view outstrips act consequentialism with 
respect to expressive power. In particular, they claim that global consequentialism 
– but not act consequentialism – can account for our normative ambivalence in 
cases where agents perform the right act out of bad motives, and that act 
consequentialism – but not global consequentialism – is silent on questions of 
character. In this paper, I have argued that both claims are false. If certain 
empirical hypotheses about the persistence and causal efficacy of motives and 
decision-procedures are true, act consequentialists can account for our normative 
ambivalence by noting that the agent’s act is evidence that they have acted and 
will act wrongly at other times. And they can respond to the character questions 
by citing the connections between certain motives, decision-procedures, and right 
acts. If these empirical hypotheses are not true, then the global consequentialist 
account of our normative ambivalence and answers to the character questions 
also evaporate. So, whether the hypotheses are true or not, the Normative 
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